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 Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard
￿
Patterns of Corporate
Ownership: Insights from a
unique data set
Using a data base which is exceptionally rich and accurate by international standards,
this paper quantiﬁes a wide range of ownership structure characteristics for all Oslo Stock
Exchange ﬁrms in the period 1989–1997. Overall, we ﬁnd that their ownership struc-
tures differ remarkably from those of other European ﬁrms. We speculate that a social-
democratic rule and strong legal protection of stockholder rights may explain why the
personal investment in Norwegian listed ﬁrms is so limited (low direct ownership), why
the largest owner is so small (low concentration), and why the other major owners are so
large (ﬂat power structure). Our ﬁndings raise two questions about the viability of corpo-
rate governance systems in general. The ﬁrst is whether delegated monitoring carried out
by state bureaucrats and corporate managers is an effective disciplining mechanism. The
second question is whether low ownership concentration produces strong managers and
weak owners or whether the ﬂat power structure facilitates joint monitoring by owners
who are individually weak, but collectively strong. JEL codes: G3, K22, L22.
Does corporate governance matter? Judging
from existing ownership structures and pub-
lic policy in many countries, the answer is
yes. For instance, national owners control
the largest bank in every European country
except in Belgium, and the current Norwe-
gian government apparently thinks the state
shouldhold a blocking minority in the largest
commercial bank. Until 1995, a regulation
applying to all Norwegian ﬁrms ruled that
international investors as a group could not
hold more than one third of a ﬁrm’s vot-
ing shares. Thus, it seems the owner’s iden-
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Ownership and Economic Performance at the University of Oslo, and the International Workshop on Corporate
Governance hosted by the Norwegian School of Management BI. This research is supported by a grant from the
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tity is considered so important that the state
usesboth fundsandlegislation toexclude cer-
tain owner types from certain ownership po-
sitions.
Besides its identity, the size of an equity
holding is also of concern for public policy.
For instance, no investor can own more than
10% of a Norwegian bank or insurance ﬁrm,
an investor controlling 40% of a listed ﬁrm’s
voting shares must give a tender offer to all
remaining shareholders, and any shareholder
controlling at least 90% can buy out the mi-
nority.
Public concern for the ownership struc-
ture of private ﬁrms may be rationally mo-
tivated by externalities. In contrast, private
investors are concerned with corporate gover-
nance because it may inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s eco-
nomic performance. Corporate governance
in general and ownership structure in partic-
ularis afactor of production, andthe optimal
ownership structure is the one which max-
imizes ﬁrm value. Although such a value-
maximizing ownership structure is hard to
specify in detail (see e.g Hart (1995) and
Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), a recent sum-
mary of the empirical research concludes that
corporate governance does matter, as cer-
tain ownership structure characteristics vary
systematically with ﬁrm performance (Gu-
gler, 2001). These characteristics include
owner identity (e.g. ﬁrm insiders vs. out-
siders, or public vs. private investors), hold-
ing size (such as the voting power of the
largest owner), and the relative size of dif-
ferent share classes (such as voting vs. non-
voting equity).
Our paper focuses on ownership char-
acteristics alone rather than the relationship
between ownership and performance. We
think there are two reasons why a descrip-
tive study of Norwegian ownership is inter-
esting per se. First, our data set is remark-
ably comprehensive and accurate by inter-
national standards. For instance, ownership
data available for the US, Japan, the UK, and
continental Europe are based on large hold-
ings only, as there are no legal requirements
to report small stakes. Thus, all stakes be-
low a minimum reporting threshold of 2–5%
(depending on the country) cannot be ob-
served. This typically implies that the owners
of roughly one third to one half of outstand-
ing equity are absent in available databases.
Moreover, because a large holding is only reg-
istered when it passes certain discrete thresh-
olds (like 10%, 20% and 50% of outstand-
ing equity), all stakes in–between the thresh-
olds are estimated with error. Also, except
for the UK and the US, the available interna-
tional evidence refers to just one or two years
in the mid 1990s. In contrast, our data set,
which includes every owner of every listed
Norwegian ﬁrm over the period 1989–1997,
offers a rather long time series which suffers
neither from the large holdings bias nor the
discrete thresholds problem. Apparently, no
other country provides a similar opportunity
to explore the anatomy of the full ownership
structure of publicly listed corporations over
an extended time period.
The second reason why ownership of
Norwegian ﬁrms is worth considering is
partly national, partly international. Be-
yond statistics on aggregate holdings by dif-
ferent investor types published by the Oslo
Stock Exchange (OSE), no systematic study
of ownership structure exists. Thus, although
we know what fraction of Norwegian listed
ﬁrms is ownedby for instance all institutional
investors as a group, we do not know whether
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large, whether such investors prefer voting
to non-voting shares, or whether they con-
centrate their equity portfolio in certain ﬁrm
types. An international rationale for analy-
zing Norwegian ownership structures is the
current trend of comparing corporate gov-
ernance systems across many countries (see
e.g. La Porta et al., 1998 and Barca and
Becht, 2001). This research suggests that a
country’s legal and regulatory regime inﬂu-
ences its corporate governance system. For
instance, it seems that the weaker the legal
protection of ownership rights, the less de-
veloped the equity market, the more con-
centrated the ownership structure, and the
lower the value creation (La Porta et al.,
2000). Accordingly, insights into how the
institutional environment inﬂuences corpo-
rate governance cannot be gained without a
sufﬁciently comprehensive set of observations
across different regulatory regimes. Adding
new detailed insights on ownership struc-
ture in a different institutional environment
may improve our general understanding of
the macro-determinants of corporate gover-
nance. Such a new observation would be par-
ticularly usefulif thecountry’sownershippat-
terns are sufﬁciently different from what has
been found elsewhere. Norway turns out to
be such an atypical case.
T h er e s to ft h ep a p e ri so r g a n i z e da sf o l -
lows. The ﬁrst section brieﬂy describes the
regulatory elements which may matter for
ownership structure. The next presents key
characteristics of the Norwegian stock mar-
ket and our source of ownership structure
data. We then classify investors into ﬁve basic
types and document their aggregateholdings.
We analyze the separate stake per investor in
the next section, focusing on the large own-
ers. We then analyze how owners concentrate
power by separating voting rights from cash
ﬂow rights. We ﬁnally relate our ﬁndings
to the existing international evidence before
summarizing and concluding the paper.1
The institutional framework
According to La Porta et al. (1998), the value
of ownership rights attached to corporate eq-
uity depends on the country’s legal system
and the quality of its law enforcement. The
world’s two major systems of commercial leg-
islation are the common law (of English de-
scent) and the civil law (of Roman origin).
The civil law family consists of the French,
German, and Scandinavian legal traditions.
As Norway belongs to the latter, it is a civil
law country. According to Zweigert and Kotz
(1998), the Scandinavian law tradition is less
closely related to Roman law than its French
and German relatives.
The primary ﬁrm-external tools for regu-
lating Norwegian corporate governance are
the corporate law (Aksjeloven), the securi-
ties law (Verdipapirhandelsloven), and the list-
ing requirements of the Oslo Stock Exchange
(Børsloven and Børsforskriften). In the follow-
ing, we outline and evaluate this judicial sys-
tem in a corporate governance framework.
The ﬁduciary duty
No law or public regulation sets it as an ex-
plicit duty of the management and the board
to maximize the value of equity holders’
claim. On the other hand, there is no stated
obligation to prioritize other stake-holders
1The present paper draws heavily on our research report (Bøhren and Ødegaard, 2000), which contains a more
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than owners (like creditors and employees)
or to trade off potential conﬂicts of interest
in certain ways. Thus, although stockholders
cannot rely on the courts to enforce equity
value maximization, it may be argued that
the pressure on management towards equity
value maximization has increased over the
sample period. This is both due to a growing
use of earnings-, stock-, and options-based
incentive contracts and the trend in Norway
and most other European countries to chal-
lenge the stake-holder idea by the more nar-
row stockholder approach to corporate gov-
ernance.
The board structure
Norwegian listed ﬁrms have a two-tier board
system. All ﬁrms with at least 200 employ-
ees must have a supervisory board (bedrifts-
forsamling), where 2/3 of the members are
elected by the owners and one third by and
amongtheemployees. Thesupervisory board
elects the board (styre), where two thirds of
the seats are for the owners’ candidates and
one third is for employee candidates. Be-
sides choosing the board, the supervisory
boardmakestheﬁnaldecision (basedon cases
passed down from the board) on large invest-
ments and on rationalizations which reduce
the number of employees.
All votes in the board and the supervisory
committee are by simple majority. There-
fore, even though the two-tier system expli-
citly recognizes the employees as a legitimate
stake-holder group with seats in both boards,
the combined effect of election principles and
voting rules still puts the ultimate power in
the owners’ hands.
The stockholder meeting
Any owner can put an item on the agenda
for the ordinary stockholder meeting. Own-
ers representing at least 10% (5% after 1995)
of the cash ﬂow rights can force an extraordi-
nary stockholder meeting. Voting rules apply
to owners who attend the stockholder meet-
ing rather than to all owners. Thus, own-
ership without presence produces no power.
Changes in the corporate charter (vedtek-
ter) requires a super-majority of 2/3, whereas
most other issues need a simple majority.
Mechanismsfor separating cashﬂow rights
from voting rights
Although one-share one-vote is the basic
principle of the corporate law, it allows for
two exceptions, provided they are explicitly
stated in the corporate charter. First, the ﬁrm
may issue up to 50% of its shares as non-
voting. Second, ﬁrms may introduce voting
caps and temporary restrictions on the right
to vote.
Non-voting shares (B shares) are not al-
ways powerless relative to voting shares.
When the corporate charter is up for revi-
sion, any amendment ﬁrst requires a super-
majority of 2/3 of the voting shares. Here, B
shares are indeed powerless. However, there
must also be a 2/3 super-majority among
all shareholders (selskapets kapital). In this
setting, non-voting shares have full power.
Hence, even though owners of B shares can-
not vote on matters requiring a simple ma-
jority, they enjoy full rights in one of the two
voting rounds on matters which require a 2/3
super-majority. Examples are new stock is-
sues, merger proposals, voting right restric-
tions, and modiﬁcations of the corporation’sPatterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set 59
objectives.
Non-voting shares served an additional
function until year-end 1994. Until then,
international investors could not own more
than one third of the voting shares of a com-
pany. Under this regime, one way of at-
tracting international owners without viola-
ting the ownership cap was by issuing non-
voting B shares. However, this regulatory re-
striction was seldom binding. Among the 33
ﬁrms with dual-class shares in our sample pe-
riod, only two had ﬁlled their quota of voting
international investors (Ødegaard, 2000, ta-
ble A.5). Hence, non-voting shares were ap-
parently not issued toattract international in-
vestors who could not hold voting shares, but
rather to give investors in general the choice
between shares with full or limited ownership
rights.
Although there is no general restriction
on the use of voting caps, an industry-speciﬁc
regulation states that no investor can own or
vote for more than 10% of the share capi-
tal in a ﬁnancial institution. As this rule is
stated in terms of both cash ﬂow rights and
voting rights, the cap applies to voting shares,
non-voting shares, and share-less proxy hold-
ers alike. By implicitly putting a ceiling on
the maximum gap between the voting right
and the cash ﬂow right, this regulation limits
the ability to separate these two components
of the ownership right.
Stockholders may increase their power
without buying more voting stock by estab-
lishing voting pacts with other stockholders.
This separation mechanism is regulated to a
limited extent. If a ﬁrm is aware of a vot-
ing pact between its shareholders, it must ﬁle
the pact with the stock exchange. As the par-
ties to the voting pact have no ﬁling obliga-
tion, however, public information on voting
pactsas provided by theOSE is ratheruseless.
In private communications with former and
current OSE ofﬁcials, we are told that vot-
ing pacts between stockholders of Norwegian
listed ﬁrms is a rare phenomenon. Hence,
this lack of data may not seriously limit our
ability to capture a realistic picture on separa-
tion.
Stockholders may also transfer voting
right to others by proxy votes.T h e r ea r en or e -
strictions on the use of proxy votes, but their
existence can only be observed if they are ac-
tually used at the stockholder meeting.
Unlike countries like Italy, which has a
cap on how much two ﬁrms can recipro-
cally own in each other, Norway has no gen-
eral regulation on intercorporate investments.
However, ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial industry (in-
surance ﬁrms, mutual funds and banks) can-
not freely hold other ﬁrms’ shares. Insurance
companies can hold up to 15% of the cash
ﬂow or voting rights of other ﬁrms, and mu-
tual funds cannot own more than 10% and
vote for no more than 5%. Banks have no di-
rect restrictions in terms of a maximum per-
centage holding per ﬁrm. Instead, there is
one cap on the total amount of equity in-
vestments across all ﬁrms and another cap
on each separate investment (see Bøhren and
Ødegaard (2000) for details).
In order to fully capture the effect of
intercorporate investments on concentration
and separation, all equity stakes in a ﬁrm
must be traced through all layers of inter-
mediate corporate share-holdings (like mu-
tual funds or interlocking pyramids of listed
and unlisted ﬁrms) back to the ultimate per-
sonal owner. The extent of separation can
then be measured by the ratio of voting rights
to cash ﬂow rights held both directly and
indirectly by the ultimate investor. A re-60 Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard
cent paper on indirect share-holdings in Nor-
way studies intercorporate investments be-
tween listed ﬁrms over the period 1980-1994
(Bøhren and Norli, 1997). The overall ﬁnd-
ing is that on average, listed ﬁrms hold 15%
of the market value of listed ﬁrms’ equity.
Even though these aggregate intercorporate
investments are large by international stan-
dards, the authors ﬁnd that each individual
holding is still small and short-lived. The
mean fraction held is 2.8%, the median is
0.4%, and the mean and median holding
period is respectively 1.7 and 1 year. After
testing several predictions about potential de-
terminants of intercorporate share-holdings,
Bøhren and Norli (1997) conclude that most
Norwegian listed ﬁrms do not make such in-
vestments primarily for strategic or control
reasons, but rather as an integral part of their
cash management system.
Minority protection
A wide set of regulations (partly corporate
law, partly listing requirements) have been
passed to prevent theunfair transfer of wealth
from small to large stockholders. A ﬂagging
system informs small investors when owner-
ship rights are transferred to the ﬁrm’s large
investors. Under the rules prevailing at the
end of the sample period, an investor passing
up or down through the thresholds of 10%,
20%, 33%, 50%, 67% and 90% of the out-
standing cash ﬂow or voting rights must no-
tify both the ﬁrm and the OSE.
The basic regulatory tool for minority
protection is the principle of equal propor-
tional rights for every stockholder. The law
states that no corporate charter can limit the
owner’s right to attend the stockholder meet-
ing, be present by a proxy representative,
bring along an advisor, put any case on the
agenda for voting, receive the same informa-
tion as any other stockholder, or to bring de-
cisions made at the stockholder meeting up
for the courts. The law also speciﬁes a pre-
emptive right for every stockholder to partic-
ipate in issues of new equity. This right can
only be waived by a 2/3 majority vote.
As for the explicit protection of small
stockholders relative to large, investors pass-
ing the 45% voting rights threshold (40% af-
ter 1 dec 1997) must give a tender offer to
all remaining shareholders. An owner of at
least 90% of the shares is obliged to buy the
shares from any stockholder who wants tosell
(this rule is symmetric, as the 90% major-
ity owner has the right to buy the remaining
shares from the minority). Moreover, the list-
ing requirements ensure a minimum share-
holder dispersion at the initial public offer-
ing (IPO). At least 25% of the shares must be
owned by the general public, and at least 500
investors (50 investors for small ﬁrms) must
ownatleast oneroundlot. Finally, theinsider
trading rules state that regardless of whether
or not you are afﬁliated with the ﬁrm, it is
illegal to trade in its shares based on ﬁrm-
speciﬁc private information which is pricing
relevant. Certain ﬁrm insiders are automati-
cally barred from trading around certain cor-
porate events, like the managementteam two
monthsbefore theannualreport is published.
All such ﬁrm insiders must currently (after
1997) report their trades to the OSE no later
than the morning after the trading day.
These stockholder protection rights are
independent of the number of shares held
or whether shares are voting or non-
voting. Several additional ownership rights
are granted to shareholders who represent a
certain minimum of the share capital, againPatterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set 61
independently of their voting status. Share-
holders owning at least 10% of the outstand-
ing share capital can force the appointment
of an additional auditor, initiate an extra-
ordinary stockholder meeting, prompt an in-
vestigation of management’s actions or sue
any member of the management team, the
two boards, the auditor, and other stock-
holders in the ﬁrm.
Based on this rather wide set of corporate
governance characteristics of the Norwegian
regulatory regime, it is still not straightfor-
ward to make simple conclusions about over-
all system qualities. Such conclusions would
require some external standard in terms of
regimes which are either normatively attrac-
tive or at least observed elsewhere. Using
a much smaller set of characteristics than
ours which they consider particularly impor-
tant for corporate governance, La Porta et al.
(1998) recently classiﬁed the legal regimes of
49 countries according to their degree of in-
vestor protection. Their primary ﬁnding is
that investor protection varies systematically
across legal regimes. Investor protection in-
herent in the commercial law is on average
strongest in common law countries (like Ar-
gentina, India, the UK, and the US) and
weakest in civil law countries of the French
type (like Belgium, France, Italy, and Mex-
ico), with the German and Scandinavian civil
law traditions in between.
Looking more closely at their ranking of
both overall regimes and individual countries
within a regime, several ﬁndings are relevant
to our case. Based on seven characteristics of
shareholder rights, Norway gets the highest
score in the Scandinavian family.2 In fact,
Norway’s score equals the average score of
the common-law countries, which top the
ranking list. The Norwegian legal tradition
also achieves the highest average score on the
rule of law, including the maximum score
on law enforcement. Finally, the Scandina-
vian regulatory regime gets the highest aver-
age rating on the informativeness of its ﬁnan-
cialaccounting standards. Thisaveragerating
equals Norway’s score.
In this section on the institutional en-
vironment of Norwegian corporate gover-
nance, we have outlined the ﬁduciary duty of
management,the power structure of the two-
tiered board, the voting rules at the stock-
holder meeting, the mechanisms for sepa-
rating cash ﬂow rights from voting rights,
and the protection of minority sharehold-
ers. Supplementing these characteristics with
the international comparison of different le-
galregimesmadeby La Porta etal. (1998), we
conclude thattheNorwegian regulatoryenvi-
ronment allows both stockholders as a group
and small stockholders as a subgroup to ex-
ert their ownership rights in a rather effective
way.
The market place and the source of
ownership structure data
The Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) is mod-
erately sized by international standards. At
2The La Porta et al. (1998) criteria are: 1) whether the law explicitly forbids deviations from the one share-one
vote principle, 2) whether the law allows voting by mail, 3) whether shares can be traded with their voting rights
attached just before stockholder meetings, 4) whether owners can cast all their votes for one board candidate (cu-
mulative voting) or elect board representatives according to their ownership stake (proportional representation),
5) whether oppressed minorities can easily strike back, 6) whether preemptive rights to new security issues exist,
and 7) the percentage of outstanding shares required to call an extraordinary shareholder meeting.62 Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard
year-end 1997, the 217 listed ﬁrms had an
aggregate market capitalization equivalent of
67billion USD,which ranksthe OSEtwelfth
among the 21 European stock exchanges for
which comparable data is available. Like
most European stock markets, the OSE has
developed rapidly in the nineties. During
our sample period 1989–1997, the number
ofﬁrmslisted grewfrom 129 to217, themar-
ket value of their equity increased by an an-
nualaverage of 11.6% in real terms, andmar-
ket liquidity as measured by annual turnover
(transaction value/average market value) al-
most doubled from 0.52 in 1989 to 0.97 in
1997. By year–end 1997, the OSE market
value was 43% of GDP, which is close to the
European median of 49%. The average mar-
ket value per ﬁrm was about one ﬁfth the av-
erage NYSE ﬁrm and about twice the average
NASDAQ ﬁrm.
High-quality, comprehensive data on
corporate ownership is hard to ﬁnd in any
country. Typically, ﬁrms are only required
to publicly disclose certain components of
their ownership structure on certain occa-
sions, like theholdings ofthe tenlargest own-
ers in the annual report or the fraction held
by a large owner who passes through discrete
thresholds triggering ﬂagging or mandatory
bids. However, according to a law issued in
1985 (Lovomverdipapirsentral), a Norwegian
listed ﬁrm must report every transaction in its
outstanding equity to the securities registry
VPS (Verdipapirsentralen). The notiﬁcation
speciﬁes the identity of the buyer and seller,
the exact time of the transaction, the number
of securities traded, and the price per secu-
rity. Any change in the number of securities
outstanding must be reported, such as stock
splits, issues of treasury stock, and the ﬂota-
tion of new equity.
In certain legal contingencies, the VPS
must disclose their data to government agen-
cies like the security exchange commission
(Kredittilsynet) and the internal revenue ser-
vice (Skattedirektoratet). Otherwise, data on
an individual ﬁrm’s ownership structure can-
not be published without explicit permission
from the ﬁrm. Thus, the VPS data is not
public. However, because the VPS has the
right to provide anonymous data for research
purposes, we were given access to the full
ownership structure of every Norwegian ﬁrm
at year-end over the period 1989–1997.
Our VPS data differs in several funda-
mental ways from the data generated by the
EU transparency directive.3 First, only the
EU data are publicly available. Second, the
VPSdataisbasedoncash ﬂowrights, whereas
the EU directive relates to voting rights. This
implies that beyond the impact of non-voting
shares, the VPS data base provides no infor-
mation on how voting rights may differ from
cash ﬂow rights due to mechanisms like cor-
porate voting restrictions, voting pacts, vot-
ing by proxy, and indirect share-holdings. All
this information must be supplied by the in-
vestors in the EU directive countries. How-
ever, as the EU directive does not mandate
the disclosure of cash ﬂow rights, the rela-
tionship between cash ﬂow and voting rights
cannot be fully analyzed from such data bases
either.
Third, the EU directive dictates the pub-
lication of voting blocks, i.e, large holdings of
voting rights. The lower notiﬁcation limit is
5%, and further notice must be given when
the investor passes up or down through the
3EU-directive 88/627/EEC, which is also called the large holdings directive.Patterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set 63
thresholds of 10%, 20%, 1/3, 50%, and 2/3
of the voting rights. This means a consider-
able portion of the ownership structure is left
out from the data base. For instance, the re-
porting thresholds of 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%,
75% and 90% only reveal two thirds of the
full ownership structure of the average Aus-
trian ﬁrm (Gugler et al., 1998, table 4). The
Dutch thresholds of 5, 10, 25, 50 and 66
2/3% only pick up 48% of the holdings in
a typical Dutch corporation (de Jong et al.,
1998, table 1).
The EU system based on the reporting of
large blocks at discrete counting intervals cre-
ates two potential data base problems. First,
as investments below the lower reporting
threshold are ignored, any measure of hold-
ings per investor is imprecise and potentially
biased. For instance, if personal investors
are overrepresented below the lower report-
ing threshold, the observed fraction of a ﬁrm
owned by personal investors (i.e., those above
the lower threshold) underestimates the true
fraction. Second, as one cannot observe the
true size of large holdings in-between the re-
porting thresholds, ownership concentration
based on the blocks is estimated with error,
like the fraction held by the largest owner.
Moreover, the estimate will also be biased un-
less thetrueownership fractions happen tobe
uniformly distributed between the reporting
thresholds.
Because the VPS data contains the full
ownership structure, it does not suffer from
these two weaknesses. Moreover, the data
base is fully computer readable and has been
operative since 1989. It seems fair to con-
clude this section by stating that our data
set provides a time series of comprehensive,
high-quality ownership structure characteris-
tics which is currently unavailable in other
countries.
Characteristics of aggregate ownership
This section ﬁrst assigns each owner of Oslo
Stock Exchange (OSE) ﬁrms to one of ﬁve
basic categories and reports their aggregate
holdings. We subsequently split the basic in-
vestor types into ﬁner subgroups by analyzing
the aggregate stock ownership of the ﬁrms’
insiders and of other listed corporations.
Owner types
Table 1 groups the owners of OSE ﬁrms into
ﬁve types and reports the equally-weighted
average number of investors per ﬁrm over the
years.
Table 1. The average number of owners per ﬁrm.
Year
Owner type
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
All
S t a t e 3344444444
International 1914 1830 1536 1108 361 290 234 218 184 737
Individuals 3776 4425 5741 5687 4789 4082 3729 3698 3079 4175
Financials 27 30 29 28 37 45 50 59 59 43
Nonﬁnancials 177 211 224 212 189 180 177 182 189 191
For each ﬁrm we calculate the number of owners of each type. The ﬁgures are equallyweighted averages
across ﬁrms. Data from all ﬁrms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) over the period 1989–1997. Data
source: Verdipapirsentralen (VPS).64 Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard
A state owner represents either the central
or the local government (stat or kommune),
including their pension funds. According to
table 1, this owner type holds on average four
equity stakes per ﬁrm. Considering the total
number of OSE ﬁrms, this means the gov-
ernment has about 350 equity investments in
the beginning of our sample period and 800
towards the end.
An international owner is any organiza-
tion not registered in Norway or a non-
resident individual. This category contains
both international investors who register at
the VPS by name and international investors
who own anonymously through a nominee
account.4 These accounts are organized by
large international investment banks. Each
account as reported to the VPS contains only
aggregate holdings of all investors who have
registered their shares with the account man-
ager. Because we cannot identify the underly-
ing owners, each nominee account is counted
as one international investor. The sharply
declining time series in the second row of
table 1 may therefore say little about the true
number of international investors. The de-
cline may simply reﬂect an increasing ten-
dency for international investors to not reg-
ister their shares openly, but rather through
anonymous nominee accounts. We return to
this point below.
Financial owners are private Norwegian
banks, insurance ﬁrms, pension funds, and
investment trusts (mutual funds). This cate-
gory, which is often termed institutional in-
vestors, represents a small but growing num-
ber of stockholders. The average number of
ﬁnancial investors per ﬁrm more than doub-
les from 27 to 59 over the sample period, and
the total number of equity positions held by
ﬁnancials morethanquadruplesover thenine
years.
Nonﬁnancials are private domestic ﬁrms
which are not classiﬁed as ﬁnancial owners.
The average number of equity stakes per ﬁrm
held by this investor type stays close to 200
over the entire period.
Finally, individuals are non-corporate
(personal) investors with Norwegian resi-
dency. Except for non-corporate members of
the internationalinvestors category, individu-
als are the only investors in table 1 represent-
ing ultimate owners. The remaining owner-
ship is indirect, as there is at least one layer
of corporate equity holdings between the ul-
timate owner and the OSE ﬁrm. The indi-
viduals category contains by far the largest
number of investors. There are close to four
thousand personal investors per ﬁrm in the
beginning of the sample period, increasing to
almost six thousand in the early nineties and
gradually declining to about three thousand
investors per ﬁrm in 1997.
Firm types
We categorize the listed ﬁrms into four types.
IPO (Initial Public Offering) ﬁrmsare quoted
on a separate list (SMB listen) and are subject
to less strict listing requirements than the re-
maining OSE ﬁrms, which are on the main
list (Hovedlisten).5 The IPO ﬁrms are nor-
4The identity of investors using nominee accounts is unknown to the public, but must be revealed to Kredittil-
synet (the Norwegian equivalent of the SEC) on demand. The voting right of a nominee share cannot be exercised
unless the owner’s identity is reported to the ﬁrm and thus also to the VPS.
5To be quoted on the main (respectively IPO) list, the market value of equity must be at least 10 (8) mill. NOK,
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mally young and have recently been brought
to the exchange (i.e, had their IPO). As we
show in Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000), IPO
ﬁrms are also much smaller than most others.
Their mean market value over the sample pe-
riod is19% ofthe average OSEﬁrm size. The
number of IPO ﬁrms grows from 24 in 1989
to 76 in 1997.
Financials are commercial banks and in-
surance companies. These ﬁrms are more
regulatedthanothers, bothinoperations (e.g,
through minimum capital coverage ratios)
and governance (e.g, through caps on max-
imum holdings per owner). The commer-
cial banks were hit hard by a banking crisis
which started in the late eighties. The ﬁrst
insolvencies in Norwegian banks occurred in
1987. Four years later, the state took over the
second and third largest commercial banks
(respectively Kreditkassen and Fokus Bank).
The state also acquired 50% of the largest
commercial bank (DnB) and became its sole
owner in 1992 (Kaen and Michalsen, 1997;
Ongena et al., 2000). The state involvement
was reduced towards the end of the sample
period. As of 1997, the state holdings in the
largest, second largest and third largest banks
was respectively 52%, 51% and 0%.
Financials constitute the lowest number
of ﬁrms in any year, their number decreases
over time, and they have the largest mean
ﬁrm size towards the end of the sample pe-
riod. By 1997, the population of OSE ﬁnan-
cials contains 7 commercial banks and 1 in-
surance ﬁrm, down from respectively 12 and
2 in 1989.
The OSE is the world’s largest stock ex-
change for shipping ﬁrms, which have his-
torically been dominated by family-owned
businesses operating in international product
and capital markets. Currently, about every
fourth OSE ﬁrm is in shipping. The mean
size of a shipping ﬁrm is close to the market-
wide OSE average of 2.1 bill NOK.
We classify the remaining ﬁrms as indus-
trials. This category is the most numerous,
accounting for roughly half the OSE ﬁrms.
Although ﬁnancials are on average consider-
ably larger than industrials towards the end
of the sample period, the largest ﬁrms are
found among the industrials. For instance,
the largest industrial (Norsk Hydro) in 1997
is 3.7 times the size of the largest ﬁnancial
(DnB) as measured by equity value.
Across every year andﬁrm type, the mean
ﬁrm size is two to four times the median.
This reﬂects the well-known international
pattern that in the population of listed ﬁrms,
a small number of them are much larger than
the others. For instance, the largest Norwe-
gian industrial in 1997 has a market value of
NOK 82.4 bill, the mean ﬁrm size is 4.5 bill,
the median is 1.5 bill, and the smallest in-
dustrial has a market value of 0.04 bill. The
same story is told by the fact that whereas the
equally-weighted mean market value is NOK
2.1 bill, the value-weighted mean is 19.3 bill.
Aggregate holdings by the ﬁve basic owner
types
Table 2 shows the overall fraction of ﬁrm eq-
uity held by the various investor types. Since
these aggregates are value-weighted, they also
reﬂect the proportions owned of OSE market
value.
can be on the main list, but there is no such requirement for the IPO list.66 Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard
Table 2. The aggregate fraction of OSE market value held by the ﬁve basic owner types.
Year
Owner type 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 All
S t a t e 1 31 51 72 22 12 22 01 81 4 1 8
I n t e r n a t i o n a l3 02 92 82 92 83 03 23 33 2 3 1
I n d i v i d u a l s 1 21 11 01 01 11 01 01 0 81 0
Financials 13 16 17 17 17 16 16 20 21 18
Nonﬁnancials 32 29 28 22 23 22 22 20 25 24
The fractions are value weighted averages across ﬁrms, using the marketvalue of a ﬁrm’s equity as weight. Data from
all ﬁrms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) over the period 1989–1997. Data source: Verdipapirsentralen
(VPS). Numbers in percent.
According to table 2, international in-
vestors as a group have held the largest eq-
uity portfolio at the OSE since 1992, owning
31% of market value on average. As we show
in Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000), the decreas-
ing number of openly registered OSE invest-
ments shown in table 1 is offset by a corre-
sponding increase in the value held through
nominee accounts. For instance, 15% of the
value held by international investors in the
ﬁrst ﬁve years of the sample period are in
nominee accounts. In the last four years, the
ratio is almost four times higher (56%).
Nonﬁnancial domestic corporations own
24% of OSE equity, hold a disproportion-
ally large part of shipping companies (40%),
and have generally decreased their share over
time. Financial owners, who hold 18% and
are the third largest owner type, are quite dif-
ferent. They have no aggregate preference
for particular ﬁrm types, and they increase
their holdings from 13% in 1989 to 21% in
1997. However, there are large differences
between sub-classes of ﬁrms within the ﬁnan-
cials category. Banks are generally insigniﬁ-
cant owners, insurance ﬁrms keep an almost
constant fraction of 11% throughout, and
mutual funds acquire increasing portions of
OSE market value. Starting from a 1% frac-
tion in 1989, mutual funds end up owning
8% of market value in 1997.
Although the fraction of market value
owned by the state is practically identical to
that of ﬁnancial investors, the portfolio char-
acteristics differ. First, the aggregate size of
the state holdings is more unstable, going
from 13% in 1989 up to 22% in 1994 and
thendown to 14% in 1997. Second, we show
in Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000) that state
holdings gravitate towards industrials and ﬁ-
nancials.
State ownership in ﬁnancials (banks and
insurance ﬁrms) is negligible during the ﬁrst
two years, starts growing in 1991 and reaches
a maximum of 40% in banks and 12% in
insurance two years later. After 1993, state
ownership in banks stays high, and is 37%
in the ﬁnal sample year. A corresponding
story is told by the maximum state owner-
ship in any single bank, which is less than
1% in the two ﬁrst years, increases to 20% in
1991, reaches 71% two years later, and stays
above 50% thereafter. As described earlier,
this ownership pattern reﬂects a deep crisis in
theNorwegianbankingindustryandthegov-
ernment’s intervention to keep the banks out
of bankruptcy by temporarily taking over thePatterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set 67
three largest banks.6
Individual investors, who hold more than
80% of all OSE equity positions, own on av-
eragejust10% of marketvalue. There is a de-
clining trend from 12% in 1989 to 8% nine
years later, and it turns out that IPO ﬁrms are
heavily overrepresented in the portfolio of in-
dividual investors. The fraction was merely
8% in 1989, reached 40% three years later,
and stays around 25% thereafter. Personal
investors as a group rebalanced their portfo-
lio in the sample period by gradually increas-
ing the stake in IPO ﬁrms at the expense of
ﬁnancials and shipping. The fractions held
in ﬁnancials and shipping in 1989 were 18%
and 17%, respectively, declining to just 6%
in 1997.
Summarizing, there are on the average
0.7 mill. separate equity positions at the
OSE. Assigning these holdings to owner
types, we ﬁnd that individual (personal)
shareholders hold more than 80% of the po-
sitions, but just 10% of market value. In-
ternational investors, who hold the largest
aggregate fraction of market value, increas-
ingly abstain from using their voting rights.
Non-ﬁnancialdomesticﬁrmsownaboutone-
fourth of market value, more in the begin-
ning than in the end of the sample period.
The third largest owner types are ﬁnancials
(institutional investors) and the state, who
both hold about one ﬁfth of market value.
Among the ﬁnancials, banks are quite in-
signiﬁcant owners, insurance ﬁrms are the
largest, and mutual funds grow the most.
To explore these patterns more formally,
while also allowing for potential multivariate
patterns and relationships between ﬁrm size,
ﬁrm type and aggregateholdings, we estimate
the regression model speciﬁed in table 3.
Table 3. The estimated relationship between aggregate holdings per investor type, ﬁrm














State -0,199 0,014 -0,004 -0,076 -0,046 0,09
(0,02) (0,00) (0,76) (0,00) (0,01)
International -0,536 0,037 -0,045 0,011 0,034 0,07
(0,00) (0,00) (0,05) (0,48) (0,03)
Individual 0,832 -0,032 -0,031 -0,059 0,050 0,18
(0,06) (0,00) (0,07) (0,00) (0,01)
Financials -0,141 0,016 0,073 -0,046 -0,018 0,08
(0,01) (0,00) (0,01) (0,01) (0,09)
Non–ﬁnancials 1,050 -0,036 0,004 0,181 -0,025 0,15
(0,00) (0,00) (0,87) (0,00) (0,13)
The table shows the OLS coefﬁcient estimates, the p–values (in parentheses) and the
￿














































The sample size is 1255, which includes all ﬁrms listed on the OSE over the period 1989–1997.
6Notice that listed banks which were fully taken over by the state were delisted until the state sold out parts of































￿ equal one if and only if ﬁrm
￿ is a ﬁ-
nancial, shipping, and IPO ﬁrm, respectively.
When all indicators are zero, ﬁrm




￿ means the investor type’s
aggregate holding decreases with ﬁrm size.











higher (lower) the aggregate fraction of in-
vestor type
￿ in the ﬁrm type compared to its
aggregate stake in industrials.
Table 3 supplements the pattern of aggre-
gate ownership we just summarized. First,
it reveals that the aggregate fraction in an
OSE ﬁrm held by the state, by international
investors, or by ﬁnancial investors is higher
the larger the ﬁrm. Conversely, individuals
and non–ﬁnancials own their largest aggre-
gate stakes in smaller ﬁrms. Second, control-
ling for size, aggregate state holdings gravi-
tate towards industrials and ﬁnancials, where
the involvement in ﬁnancials is driven by
the government’s response to the banking
crisis. International and individual owners
both have relatively large aggregate stakes in
IPOs, and non-ﬁnancial investors are biased
towards shipping ﬁrms.
Insiders and OSE-listed ﬁrms
A corporate insider is either an international
owner, a national organization (ﬁrm or state
agency) or a national individual investor.7
Thus, insiders as deﬁned in section 1.5 is
a subset of the ﬁve basic investor types dis-
cussed so far. The second column of Table 4
shows the aggregate insider holdings by year.
The insiders of OSE ﬁrms own on aver-
age 7% of market value. As shown in Bøhren
and Ødegaard (2000), the fraction is higher
in shipping (10%) and smaller in ﬁnancials
(2%). Theoverall insider fraction stays rather
constant over time, but decreases in shipping
and IPOs. For instance, insiders held 14% of
IPO ﬁrms’ equity in 1989 and 6% nine years
later.
The equally-weighted averages (not
shown in the table) are roughly twice their
value-weighted counterparts in every year,
suggesting that the aggregate fraction of in-
sider holdings is larger in smaller ﬁrms.8 If
the number of insiders grows degressively
with ﬁrm size, this ﬁnding is consistent with
the effect of individual budget constraints
and lost diversiﬁcation beneﬁts. These costs
of a concentrated equity portfolio are higher
for insiders in a large ﬁrm than for insid-
ers with a corresponding equity fraction of a
smaller ﬁrm.
From a corporate governance point of
view, the important insiders are the board
members and the management team, since
these primary insiders control the corporate
resources in the short run. As shown by
columns 4 and 5, these insider sub-group of
primary insiders own roughly two thirds of
total insider stakes, and the board members
hold three times more than the management
team. Across ﬁrm types, we show in Bøhren
and Ødegaard (2000) that except for ﬁnan-
cials (where stock ownership by primary in-
siders is miniscule), the holdings of primary
7As the insider/outsider status of investors is not reported to the VPS, our insider data are constructed from the
ﬁles of insider trades reported to the OSE.
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insiders varies considerably less than total in-
sider holdings. For instance, total insider
stakes in industrials and shipping are on av-
erage 6% and 13%, respectively, whereas the
primary insiders hold 5% and 6%.
We next consider the second subgroup
of the ﬁve basic investor types, which is cor-
porate owners quoted on the OSE. Although
these owners may not be fundamentally dif-
ferent from non-listed corporations, we still
single them out because they allow individ-
uals (ultimate owners) to hold equity stakes
in a ﬁrm through one or more layers of other
ﬁrms. One potential effect of such an owner-
ship pattern is that the ultimate owners, who
sit behind the intermediate corporate layers,
may lever up their control rights relative to
their cash ﬂow rights along the ownership
chain. Thus, stockholders may build owner-
ship pyramids by investing indirectly through
a chain of other listed ﬁrms (Bianchi et al.,
1998).
To understand how the ultimate owners
of OSE ﬁrms exercise their ownership rights,
we need to know the holdings of all interme-
diate links in the chain. As we only have ac-
cess to the ownership structure of the OSE-
listed ﬁrms which hold equity positions in
other OSE ﬁrms, this subgroup of corporate
owners is our tool for studying indirect own-
ership.
OSE-listed investors in OSE ﬁrms is a
subset of the two basic owner types of ﬁnan-
cials and non-ﬁnancials. Column 5 of table 4
shows the aggregate fraction of OSE equity
held by these ﬁrms (the data were collected
from the owning ﬁrms’ annual reports). On
average across ﬁrms and years, indirect own-
ership through OSE-listed vehicles represent
8% of OSE market value. Indirect holdings
are relatively common in the early years and
particularly widespread in IPOs (not shown),
where 40% of the equity belonged to other
OSE ﬁrms in 1989.
Table 4. Fractionof OSE market value held by corporate insidersand by other OSE–listed
ﬁrms.
Insiders Intercorporate
all management board investors
￿
1989 7 3 1 14 119
1990 8 1 2 12 109
1991 11 2 3 11 103
1992 7 1 4 9 112
1993 6 1 4 11 123
1994 7 1 4 8 130
1995 7 2 3 6 146
1996 6 2 4 5 155
1997 5 1 3 4 200
Total 7 1 3 8 1197
The table shows the fraction of market value held by all corporate insiders (all), the management team (mgm), the
board of directors (brd), and by other OSE-listed ﬁrms (Intercorp investors), and the number of observations (
￿).
Data from all ﬁrms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) over the period 1989–1997. Data source: Oslo Stock
Exchange (OSE). Numbers in percent.70 Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard
The most striking feature is the decreas-
ing time trend, which is particularly strong in
the early nineties. Indirect ownership is re-
duced by roughly two thirds towards the end
of the sample period, and the typical level
in any ﬁrm type as of 1997 is 5%. This
pattern of intercorporate investments and the
ﬁnding by Bøhren and Norli (1997) that the
typical intercorporate holding is small (me-
dian of 0.4%) collectively suggest that if we
ignore indirect ownership and only consider
direct holdings by non-listed owners, there is
probably only a modest mis-estimation of key
characteristics like ownership concentration
or the separation between cash ﬂow rights
andvoting rights. Also, since non-listed ﬁrms
normally have a considerably more concen-
trated ownership structure than listed ﬁrms,
there is limited potential for using minor
investments in non-listed ﬁrms to lever up
the voting power in listed ﬁrms. This sug-
gests that ignoring holdings through non-
listed ﬁrms may be rather inconsequential for
separation. We return to these issues in later
sections.
Voting and non-voting equity
As discussed in the section on the institional
framework, the ownership rights attached to
non-voting shares (B shares) are identical to
those of voting equity (A shares) except for
voting power. We document in Bøhren and
Ødegaard (2000) that 14% of the OSE ﬁrms
have non-voting shares outstanding, that B
shares are more common in the beginning
of the sample period; that non-voting shares
were never issued by ﬁnancials, and that only
3% of the IPO ﬁrms have ﬂoated this secu-
rity type. Thus, the non-voting stock phe-
nomenon belongs in industrials and ship-
ping, where the security is issued by roughly
e v e ryﬁ f t hﬁ r m ,a n dm o r eo f t e nb yl a r g eﬁ r m s
than small.
Non-voting shares constitute on average
10% of OSE market value. Considering
ﬁrms with dual-class shares, only (i.e., those
issuing both voting and non-voting shares),
29% of their equity is non-voting and hence
71% voting. In the two ﬁrm types where
non-votingshares areactively used,thepreva-
lence of non-voting shares is relatively con-
stant over time for industrials and both larger
and increasing in shipping. There is a signiﬁ-
cantly positive relationship (t=10.3) between
ﬁrm size and the fraction of the ﬁrm’s equity
which is non-voting.
The relative holdings of voting and non-
voting shares differs widely across investor
types. The state reveals a strong preference
for stocks with voting rights (10% vs. 3%).
This tendency also holds for individuals and
non-ﬁnancial domestic corporations, whereas
ﬁnancial investors hold roughly the same
fraction of voting and non-voting shares in
the aggregate.
International investors own 54% of non-
voting equity on average, which is more than
twice their fraction of voting equity. Its max-
imum level is 66% in 1994, gradually drop-
ping off to 47% in the ﬁnal sample year.
However, very few ﬁrms were effectively re-
stricted bytheregulatorycaponinternational
ownership, which was lifted in 1995. Thus,
it seemsthattointernationalinvestors, voting
shares in dual-class ﬁrms became more attrac-
tive after the cap was lifted, despite the fact
that there was almost no restricted access to
voting shares before the deregulation. One
speculation is that the deregulation as such
was considered a signal of a more positive at-
titude to international investors in general. IfPatterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set 71
so, it may have improved the expected payoff
to international investors from holding vot-
ing shares and expending efforts on corporate
governance activities.
To summarize, our reclassiﬁcation of the
ﬁve basic owner types in sections 3.4 and
3.5 shows that OSE insiders own on aver-
age 7% of their ﬁrms’ equity, more in ship-
ping and much less in ﬁnancials. Intercor-
porate ownership among OSE ﬁrms, which
on average accounts for 8% of market value,
is rapidly getting less common. Non-voting
shares are issued by 14% of the ﬁrms, never
issued by ﬁnancials and very seldom issued by
IPO ﬁrms. These securities, which account
for 10%of OSE marketvalue and29%of the
equity in ﬁrms with dual-class shares, are pri-
marily held by international investors (54%)
and ﬁnancials (24%).
Ownership concentration
The principal-agent paradigm predicts that
if left unattended, non-owner managers will
tend to divert parts of the ﬁrm’s free cash
ﬂow to value-destroying projects. To pre-
vent this, i.e., to ensure that value maximiza-
tion does occur, certain disciplining mech-
anisms are required. Concentrated owner-
ship (holdings of large equity stakes) is a
key such mechanism (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Unlike the ﬁrm’s holders of small eq-
uity stakes, its large owners have both the in-
centive (high cash ﬂow rights) and the power
(high voting rights) to monitor the manage-
ment team.9 Thus, not surprisingly, concen-
trated ownership is, along with insider hold-
ings, the most frequently studied mechanism
in the empirical research on the relationship
between corporate governance and economic
performance (Gugler, 2001).10 This section
addresses ownership concentration by analy-
zing the anatomy of large equity stakes.
Unlike the previous section, which used
value-weighted averages to capture the aggre-
gate claim of an investor type, we now switch
to equally-weighting. This is because the fo-
cus is not on the aggregates, but each sep-
arate owner’s ability to inﬂuence an indivi-
dual ﬁrm’s actions. As the ownership fraction
required to do so is probably independent
of ﬁrm size and deﬁnitely non-transferable
across ﬁrms, we assign equal weight to each
ownership structure (company).
Large owners make up the extreme right
tail of the distribution of equity stakes in a
ﬁrm. To get a feeling for the typical OSE
investor before we study the large ones, we
should notice that the mean and median
ownership stakes in our sample period are
0.15% and 0.008%, respectively. Thus, as
halfthestockholders on averageown lessthan
one 10 000’th of the ﬁrm’s equity, the typi-
cal OSE investor is all too small to have any
independent signiﬁcance for corporate gov-
ernance. This is true across all years and
9This argument implicitly assumes that large stockholders owns a high fraction of both cash ﬂow rights and
voting rights. If not, e.g, due to non-voting stock, indirect ownership through pyramids, or stockholder voting
pacts, cash ﬂow incentives and voting power may be unaligned. Moreover, because small stockholders free ride on
the value enhancement caused by large owners’ disciplining, monitoring may still be under-supplied unless large
owners reap sufﬁcient private beneﬁts from their monitoring efforts (Grossman and Hart, 1980).
10The full set of corporate governance mechanisms includes the legal regime, the competition in the ﬁrm’s prod-
uct market, reputation in the managerial labour market, management incentive schemes (bonus, stock, and stock
option systems), ﬁnancing policies (debt ﬁnancing, dividend payout, and equity issues), accounting and auditing
systems, the corporate board, and the ﬁrm’s ownership structure.72 Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard
ﬁrm types. Although the typical investor in
IPO ﬁrms tends to be two to three times
larger than in other ﬁrm types, the stake is
still miniscule. The only ways owners may
supervise, correct and support the manage-
ment team is either by the concerted action
of a large number of typical (i.e, very small)
owners, by individual actions of a single large
owner, or by a coalition of a few relatively
large owners.
The most common way of quantifying
concentrated ownership is by the equity stake
held by one or more of the large investors
(blockholders). Table 5 reports the average
stake of the largest, the second, third, fourth,
ﬁfth, tenth, and the twentieth largest owner.
As we show in Bøhren and Ødegaard (2000)
that the concentration of voting rights is al-
most identical to that of cash ﬂow rights, we
may interpret table 5 in terms of either one.
The two columns to the right show
that the largest investor in an OSE ﬁrm
holds 28% of the equity on average. This
investor owns 2.5 times more than the sec-
ond largest (11%), and the difference be-
tween consecutive holdings decreases as we
move down the ranking list. The cumula-
tive holdings imply that on average, the two
largest owners may collectively form a block-
ing super–minority (1/3), a coalition of the
four largest owners creates a simple major-
ity (1/2), and the ten largest may unite into a
super–majority (2/3).11
Except for ﬁnancials, this concentration
pattern prevails across ﬁrm types. Notice in
particular that IPO ﬁrms do not differ from
industrials, suggesting that the heavily con-
centrated pre-IPO owners sell out relatively
soon after the IPO. However, because large
stakes in ﬁnancials are about ten percentage
pointslower thanin otherﬁrms, ittakesmore
large investors to create a majority or minor-
ity. For instance, while the ten largest owners
in the average industrial constitute a super-
majority, it takes twenty in ﬁnancials.
Table 5. Equity fractions held by large owners.
Firm type
Owner Industrials Financials Shipping IPOs All
size rank mean cum mean cum mean cum mean cum mean cum
1 3 13 1 1 81 8 2 72 7 2 62 6 2 82 8
2 10 41 9 27 13 40 11 37 11 39
3 6 48 6 33 8 48 7 44 7 46
4 5 52 5 38 5 53 5 50 5 51
5 4 56 4 42 4 57 4 54 4 55
10 2 67 2 55 2 69 2 66 2 66
20 1 76 1 66 1 79 1 76 1 76
The table shows the average fraction held by the given rank (mean) and the total fraction held by the largest down
to the given rank (cum). The means are equally weighted. Data from all ﬁrms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange
(OSE) over the period 1989–1997. Data sources: Oslo Børsinformasjon (OBI) and Verdipapirsentralen (VPS).
Numbers in percent.
11Because the corporate law applies to the voting rights present at the stockholder meeting, these minimum
coalitions implicitly assume that all outstanding shares will attend. If instead just half of them are present, the
largest average stake of 28% transforms into a voting power of 56%, producing a simple majority for the largest
owner alone.Patterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set 73
This low concentration in ﬁnancials may
suggest that the ownership cap is binding in
the sense that we may have observed larger
holdings without this regulation. In fact,
Bergstrøm and Rydqvist (1990a) ﬁnd that af-
ter the ownership cap in Swedish banks was
lifted in 1980, concentration gradually rose
to a level which was insigniﬁcantly differ-
ent from the average concentration in other
ﬁrms.12
As discussed in the section on the in-
stitutional framework, the size of an owner-
ship fraction has at least two sets of conse-
quences which are both determined by the
legal regime. First, the corporate law speci-
ﬁes how holding size transforms into voting
power. Second, certain holding sizes trigger
pre-deﬁned events, like the obligation to ﬂag
or to bid for the remaining shares outstand-
ing. This means certain thresholds may be
particularly important to just pass (like a 1/3
super–minority), while others may be impor-
tant to not pass (like a 90% mandatory bid
threshold).
One way of spotting such patterns is by
tabulating the cumulative frequency distribu-
tion of the largest ownership stake. As this
may vary from year to year, and because the
relevant regulations may change over time,
we may lose important information by aggre-
gating across years. Therefore, ﬁgure 1 shows
a distribution of ownership structures based
on one sample year, only. The ﬁgure uses
data from 1995, when the ﬂagging thresh-
olds were 10, 25, 50 and 75%, and manda-
tory bids were triggered at 45% and 90%.
To obtain power without being forced to ﬂag
or bid, we would expect investors to ﬂock
just below these thresholds. Conversely, we
expect an over-representation just above the
voting power limits of 1/3, 1/2 and 2/3.



























percentage fraction owned by largest owner
Data from all ﬁrms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) over the period 1989–1997. Data source: Verdipa-
pirsentralen (VPS).
12The 10% cap in ﬁnancials is frequently broken, apparently because the regulator grants exceptions rather
routinely.74 Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard
Visual inspection of ﬁgure 1 suggests that
at least three of these regulations show up
in the ownership structure in the predicted
manner. First, there is an over-representation
of holdings below the lower ﬂagging thresh-
old of 10% (the cumulative distribution is
very steep justto theleft of 10% andﬂatter to
the right). Second, large investors with hold-
ings around the 45% mandatory bid limit
choose to hold fractions just below the limit
rather than above. Finally, the simple major-
ity rule of 50% produces a tendency to hold
fractions just above 50%. Thus, regulation
matters for concentration.
Who are the large owners? Table 6 answers
by documentinghowofteneachinvestor type
is the largest, second, third, fourth, and ﬁfth
largest owner. The table tells straightforward
stories. Nonﬁnancial domestic corporations,
which we know hold 24% of OSE market
value, are heavily overrepresented among the
large block-holders. This owner type has
the highest stake in 52% of all cases, and is
also more often than any other owner type
the second, third, fourth and ﬁfth largest.13
Moreover, the higher the rankof a large hold-
ing, the higher the probability that its owner
is a non-ﬁnancial corporation. For instance,
such ﬁrms own the second largest stake in
43% of the cases and the ﬁfth largest in 30%.
The pattern is quite the opposite for in-
ternational investors, who in the aggregate is
the largest owner type (31% of market value).
Regardless of size rank, such investors are less
often a large owner than domestic nonﬁnan-
cials. Moreover, while the latter prefer the
largest stakes among the large, the interna-
tional owners prefer the smaller.
Except for a lower propensity to hold the
very largest stake, the ﬁnancial corporations
(who own 18% of market value) are very sim-
ilar to international investors in their choice
between large positions: The smaller the size
ofthelargeholding, themoreoften it belongs
to a domestic ﬁnancial corporation. How-
ever, notice that compared to their aggregate
holdings of 18%, ﬁnancials are considerably
more often a large owner than international
investors. Moreover, regulation may effec-
tively force ﬁnancials towards being no. 5
rather than no. 1. For instance, mutual funds
cannot own more than 10% and vote for
more than 5% in a ﬁrm.
Table 6. The propensity to hold large equity stakes.
Owner size rank
O w n e r t y p e 12345
S t a t e 97544
International 19 21 23 25 26
Individuals 10 8 9 10 10
Financials 11 21 25 28 30
Nonﬁnancials 52 43 37 33 30
For each owner size rank we ﬁnd the fraction of ﬁrms held by each of the ﬁve basic owner types. Each column
reports the frequency distribution across owner types for the largest, second, third, fourth and ﬁfth largest equity
stake. Data from all ﬁrms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) over the period 1989–1997. Data source:
Verdipapirsentralen (VPS). Numbers in percent.
13There is a tie with ﬁnancials for the ﬁfth largest owner.Patterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set 75






















0,336 -0,011 -0,058 -0,022 -0,032 0,126 0,063 -0,029 0,043 0,09
(0,00) (0,04) (0,00) (0,04) (0,00) (0,00) (0,05) (0,08) (0,00)





￿), the table shows the OLS coefﬁcient
estimates, the p–values (in parentheses) and the
￿


















































































The sample size is 1255, which includes all ﬁrms listed on the OSE over the period 1989–1997.
State owners, who hold the same aggre-
gate OSE stake as ﬁnancials, is the least sig-
niﬁcant investor type in terms of large stakes.
Even compared to individual owners, whose
aggregate portfolio value is just about half,
the state is less frequently a large owner in
all rank categories. This consistent under-
representation suggests that compared to the
total commitment of funds, state owners play
an anonymous role in corporate governance.
Finally, individuals, who hold the highest
number of equity positions and the smallest
fraction of market value, are quite different
from other types. The probability that a big
investor is an individual is roughly 10% re-
gardless of size rank. This corresponds to the
aggregate fraction held of market value.
Table 6 tells us that the overwhelming
majority of large owners are either corpora-
tions or the state. This means the manage-
ment teams of OSE ﬁrms are not monitored
by their ultimate owners (i.e, those eventu-
ally receiving the ﬁrms’ cash ﬂow), but by the
agents of ultimate owners (i.e, other man-
agement teams or civil servants). Unlike a
simple principal-agent relationship, this is a
multiple-agent setting with delegated moni-
toring. The success of this indirect owner-
ship system may critically depend on whether
these agents have sufﬁcient equity stakes in
their ﬁrm to provide the required incentives
and whether they are monitored by ultimate
owners who are willing and able to exert suf-
ﬁcient disciplining pressure. This setting illu-
strates that, in addition to holding size per se,
the identity of the holder (here: direct vs. in-
direct owner) may matter for corporate gov-
ernance as well.
So far, we have explored the character-
istics of concentration by simply comparing
mean concentration levels across ﬁrm types,
investor types, and years. To analyze owner-
ship patterns more rigorously while also al-
lowing for dependencies between these char-
acteristics and for the effect of ﬁrm size on
concentration, we estimate the relationship






























14Because there is no theoretically superior deﬁnition of concentrated ownership, we analyze in Bøhren and
Ødegaard (2000) whether other proxies pick up similar underlying ownership characteristics as those based on
large stakes only. One ﬁnding is that the Herﬁndahl index, which reﬂects the full ownership structure of the ﬁrm,
performs very well in this respect. This index, which is the sum of the squared ownership fractions across all share-
holders, has a maximum of unity (a single investor owns every share) and approaches a minimum of zero as the
ownership structure gets increasingly diffuse.76 Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard
are indicators which are unity if and only if
ﬁrm
￿ is a ﬁnancial, shipping, and IPO ﬁrm,
respectively. As the indicator variable is zero
otherwise, ﬁrm
￿ is an industrial when all
three indicators are zero. To explore whether
the identity of the largest owner matters for


























unity if and only if the largest owner of cash
ﬂow rights in ﬁrm
￿ is the state, an interna-
tional investor, a ﬁnancial ﬁrm, and a non-
ﬁnancial ﬁrm, respectively. The largest owner
is an individual when all indicators are zero.
The estimates suggest that at a 5% level
of signiﬁcance, concentration decreases sig-
niﬁcantly with ﬁrm size,15 and concentration
increases signiﬁcantly as we move from ﬁnan-
cials (lowest concentration) through IPOs to
shipping to industrials (highest). The owner-
ship concentration is lowest when the largest
stake belongs to either an individual, an in-
ternational investor or a ﬁnancial (no signiﬁ-
cant differences). The highest concentration
tends to occur in ﬁrms where the state holds
the largest stake.16
Let us summarize this section on concen-
trated ownership. We have found that the
typical investor neither has the incentives nor
the power to be of independent importance
in corporategovernance. Thelargestinvestor,
who is very often the state or a corporation
ratherthanapersonal (ultimate)owner, holds
on average 28% of the OSE equity. This
investor holds less in large ﬁrms than small
ﬁrms, considerably less in ﬁnancials than in
other industries, and owns a particularly large
stake if the investor is the state. A coalition
of the four largest owners creates a majority,
and it takes the ten largest to establish the 2/3
super–majority required for charter amend-
ments. In ﬁnancials, the number of large in-
vestors needed to reach these power thresh-
olds must be doubled. Non-ﬁnancial domes-
tic corporations are strongly overrepresented
among large owners, while international in-
vestors and the state are considerably under-
represented. Unlike non-ﬁnancials and the
state, who are more often found at the top
of the largest-ﬁve list than at the bottom, in-
ternational investors and ﬁnancials are at the
bottom.
W em a ys p e c u l a t ew h ys o m eo ft h e s ep a t -
terns are observed. First, the negative as-
sociation between ﬁrm size and concentra-
tion is consistent with the notion that con-
centrated ownership is costly in terms of re-
duced diversiﬁcation beneﬁts. That is, the
higher the value of the ﬁrm, the more of the
owner’s wealth must be used to buy a given
percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity, and the higher
the unsystematic risk of the owner’s portfo-
lio. Second, the high aggregate state hold-
ing and the low overall concentration in ﬁ-
nancials is probably driven by a concern for
negative externalities of troubled banks and
by the legal cap on a single stake, respectively.
Third, thefact thatinternational investors are
underrepresented as large owners in general
and as the largest owner in particular suggest
that these investors primarily hold equity in
Norwegian ﬁrms to diversify their portfolio
rather than to improve corporate governance.
15Due to the state involvement in the largest banks which originated in the crisis years, there is a signiﬁcantly
positive relationship between ﬁrm size and concentration in banks.
16The year by year estimates are less clear cut. The negative relationship between concentration and size only
occurs in three of the nine years, there is hardly any signiﬁcant relationship between concentration and ﬁrm type,
and the only association between owner type and concentration is when the largest owner is the state.Patterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set 77
The disinterest in governance is also consis-
tent with our ﬁnding discussed earlier that
international investors are heavily overrepre-
sented among owners of non–voting shares,
and that they increasingly hold their shares
through anonymous nominee accounts.
Separation
As discussed in the section on the insti-
tutional framework, the relevant mechanisms
for separating cash ﬂow rights from voting
rights include regulatory caps, voting pacts,
proxy votes, the corporate charter, intercor-
porate share-holdings, and dual-class shares.
The 10% regulatory ceiling on ownership in
ﬁnancials is irrelevant for separation, as no ﬁ-
nancial has issued dual–class shares. The cap
on international holdings, which barred for-
eigners as a group from holding less than 1/3
of a ﬁrm’s equity until 1995, was very seldom
binding. Moreover, we miss data on voting
pacts, proxy votes, voting restrictions in cor-
porate charters, and ultimate owners of inter-
corporate shares. Consequently, our vehicle
for exploring separation is the relationship
between direct holdings of voting and non-
voting equity. Since we measure voting rights
by the direct ownership of voting stock, sepa-
ration is only relevant in ﬁrms with dual-class
shares. We already know from earlier discus-
sion that these ﬁrms constitute 14% of all
OSE ﬁrms, that dual–class shares are never
used by ﬁnancials and very seldom in IPO
ﬁrms, and that such securities are more of-
ten issued by large ﬁrms than by small. Non-
voting shares constitute 29% of outstanding
equity in dual-class ﬁrms, and international
owners are heavily overrepresented.
To quantify separation, we identify the
large owner based on the fraction of voting
rights held. For this owner, we next ﬁnd his
fraction of cash ﬂow rights in the ﬁrm, which
isthesum ofhis voting andnon-voting shares




￿ is the ratio of
these two fractions, i.e., the fraction of voting
rights (voting equity) to the fraction of cash




























where v and n is respectively the number of
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and separation is stronger the more
￿
￿ devi-
ates from unity. There is separation (i.e, bias)





the investor holds a larger percentage of non-
voting than voting shares. The minimum
￿
￿
is zero, which occurs if i owns non-voting eq-
uity only. Conversely, there is separation to-




￿, when the ra-
tio of non-voting to voting shares held by i is








which occurs when i holds voting shares only.
Thus, the more non-voting stock issued rela-
tive to voting, the larger the maximum sepa-
ration.
Table 8 summarizes key statistics on sep-
aration for large owners of voting shares in
dual-class ﬁrms. The table shows the equally
weighted average (mean), the standard devi-
ation (std), and the number of observations
(
￿) of the separation ratio in equation (1).
Since the ratio stays between 1.1 and 1.3
across owner size ranks, large owners tend to
concentrate voting rights, as they may vote
for 10–30% more than their cash ﬂow rights78 Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard
would suggest. There is a tendency that the
larger the owner, the stronger the separation.
For instance, our separation measure is 1.3
for the largest owner and 1.1 for the ﬁfth
largest. Still, large owners do not normally
maximize separation by holding voting shares
only. This can be inferred from the fact that
because non-voting shares constitute 38% of
all shares in dual-class ﬁrms, the average sep-









large owners held voting shares only.
By regressing the separation ratio on ﬁrm
and investor characteristics, we get several ad-
ditional insights (see Bøhren and Ødegaard
(2000) for details). First, the investor’s sep-
aration behavior is independent of ﬁrm type
and investor type. Second, only the largest
owner separates more the larger the ﬁrm and
the larger his equity stake. This suggests the
largest owner uses separation more actively
when voting power is potentially more valu-
able (large ﬁrm) and when his ability to exer-
cise the power is high (large stake). Third,
whereas the other owners separate less the
higher the fraction of voting shares outstand-
ing, the largest owner is insensitive to this
fraction. A possible explanation is that the
￿
￿
￿ majority rule for charter amendments
applies to both voting rights and cash ﬂow
rights alike. It is easily shown that if the in-
vestor wants to control both voting rounds,
the separation ratio should in fact be in-
dependent of the fraction of voting shares
outstanding. Jointly, these ﬁndings suggest
that large investors’ concern for power and
the voting rules for charter amendments may
jointly explain why the separation ratio ex-
ceeds unity, why it is less than the maximum,
and why it is independent of the fraction of
voting shares outstanding.
Besides the concern for the cash ﬂow–
based voting rule, there may be a second rea-
son why large owners abstain from maximum
separation. According to Jensen and Meck-
ling (1976), large owners mayuse their power
to divert the ﬁrm’s resources to obtain private
beneﬁts, such as granting themselves exces-
sive compensation for directorships or mak-
ing the ﬁrm trade at unfair prices with out-
side parties which are under the large owners’
control. If minority investors rationally ex-
pect this moral hazard problem, large owners
must carry the expected expropriation cost in
terms of a reduced share price. Therefore,
large owners have an incentive to convince
t h em a r k e tt h a te x p r o p r i a t i o nw i l ln o to c c u r .





1 1.3 0.4 166
2 1.2 0.4 157
3 1.2 0.4 157
4 1.2 0.4 155
5 1.1 0.4 155
The table lists the separation ratio
￿
￿ deﬁned in equation (1). The estimates only uses data for ﬁrms with dual-class
shares. Data from all ﬁrms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) over the period 1989–1997. Data sources:
Oslo Børsinformasjon (OBI) and Verdipapirsentralen (VPS).Patterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set 79
One way of signalling this to the market is
by not maximizing the ratio of voting rights
to cash ﬂow rights, but by holding a sufﬁ-
cient number of non–voting shares to con-
vince the market that any misuse of voting
rights to obtain private beneﬁts is indirectly
paid for through a reduced cash ﬂow from
the owner’s stocks. The larger the fraction of
cash ﬂow rights held by the large investor (i.e,
the smaller the separation ratio), the more
credible the signal (Bergstrøm and Rydqvist,
1990b). In a study of the separation behavior
by the largest voting owners in Swedish ﬁrms
with dual–class shares, Bergstrøm and Ry-
dqvist (1990b) ﬁnd that just like in our case,
the largest owner does not go for maximum
separation. On average, the largest owner of
voting rights was found to hold 15% more
equity than he would have held if he cared
for the voting right alone.
Summarizing this section, we have found
that in ﬁrms with dual-class shares, large
owners of voting stock concentrate voting
rights relative to cash ﬂow rights, typically
voting for 20% more than their cash ﬂow
rights would suggest. Still, large voting own-
ers often hold non-voting equity as well, pos-
sibly because charter amendments require a
two thirds majority from both cash ﬂow and
voting rights or because they try to reduce
moral hazard risks faced by small stockhold-
ers. The largest owner’s separation between
voting rights and cash ﬂow rights seems con-
sistent with this view.
The international evidence: The Nor-
wegian outlier
We have so far described the ownership struc-
ture of Norwegian ﬁrms along several dimen-
sions, such as its institutional environment,
the aggregate holdings per owner type, the
concentration of ownership, and the sepa-
ration between cash ﬂow rights and voting
rights. In order to judge whether these char-
acteristics are appropriate mechanisms for
corporate governance or at least whether the
characteristics are typical or unique, we need
an external standard of comparison. One
such yardstick is ownership structure charac-
teristics in other countries.
Comparable internationalevidence is lim-
ited both by the short history of corporate
governance research and by the lack of reli-
able data bases. Still, certain key ownership
patterns may now be compared across a rea-
sonably large number of European countries.
This section relates the evidence published by
the Federation of Stock Exchanges in Europe
(1998) and by Barca and Becht (2001) to our
ﬁndings on aggregate holdings and concen-
trated voting rights.17
The aggregate holdings of cash ﬂow rights
by the ﬁve basic owner types in twelve Eu-
ropean countries and the US is presented in
table 9. The table also shows the equally
weighted average (mean)holdings across nine
European countries excluding Norway and
theUK, andthecorresponding averagewhere
the UK is included. We report two aver-
ages because the UK differs markedly from
17Our comparison may suffer from the potential biases and inaccuracies in the estimates reported by Barca and
Becht (2001) as discussed in our discussion of the market place. The ﬁndings by the Federation of Stock Ex-
changes in Europe (1998) have similar weaknesses, as they are mostly based on the large blocks only rather than the
entire population or large, random samples. Moreover, our Norwegian data does not reﬂect the potential effects of
indirect ownership, voting by proxy, voting pacts, and voting restrictions in the corporate charter.80 Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard
the other European countries.
Table 9. The aggregate holding by the ﬁve basic owner types in eleven European countries
and the US.




1 2 3 1/2 1/3 2/3
Austria 50 1996 54 8 3 6.8 18.0 2.7
Belgium 135 1995 56 7 5 8.0 11.2 1.4
France 674 1996 52 10 4 5.2 13.0 2.5
Germany 372 1996 50 3 1 16.7 50.0 3.0
Italy 214 1996 48 10 4 4.8 12.0 2.5
Netherlands 137 1996 43
Spain 193 1995 40 11 6 3.6 6.7 1.8
Sweden 304 1998 38 11 6 3.5 6.3 1.8
Mean Europe
(excl Norway and UK) 48 9 4 5.6 11.5 2.1
UK 250 1992 14 7 6 2.0 2.3 1.2
Mean Europe
(excl Norway) 44 8 4 5.2 10.0 1.9
US 2831 1997 3 1 1 3.0 3.0 1.0
Mean western world
(excl Norway) 40 8 4 5.3 10.0 1.9
Norway 130 1997 29 11 7 2.6 4.1 1.6
The table shows the estimated fraction of market value held. Data sources are Barca and Becht (2001) for Austria
and the Federation of Stock Exchanges in Europe (1998) for the remaining countries except Norway. Numbers
in percent.
The table reveals that compared to the
other European nations in the sample, the
16% state holding in Norwegian listed ﬁrms
is high. It is almost twice the European av-
erage, and only two other countries (Finland
and Italy) have higher state ownership. Sec-
ond, international owners have a larger ag-
gregate stake than the typical European case
(31% vs. 21%), but Norway is not excep-
tional. For instance, international investors
hold the largest fraction of market value in
four other European countries as well (Bel-
gium, Finland, Spain, and Sweden).
Moving on to individual (personal) in-
vestors, Norway is quite extreme. In no other
European country do individual investors
own a smaller fraction of market value. The
8% stake is less than one third the Euro-
pean average and only about half the next-
to-smallest fraction. Comparing the two ex-
treme cases at either end, the principals (the
ultimate owners) directly own more than half
the market value in Austria. In contrast, the
ownership rights of Norwegian principals are
exercised by their intermediate agents (cor-
porations and the state) in ﬁrms representing
18This argument implicitly assumes that allinternational investors are non-individuals, whichis obviously wrong.
Since we do not know the identity of international investors who hold their stakes through anonymous nomineePatterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set 81
more than 90% of market value.18
Finally, ownership by national corpora-
tions(ﬁnancials andnon-ﬁnancials inthetwo
rightmost columns) account for 45% of mar-
ket value in Norway. This a typical European
level except in Germany and the UK, where
both the overall national ownership by cor-
porations and the fraction held by national
ﬁnancials is considerably higher.
Table 10 compares concentration lev-
els internationally by showing the equally
weighted average fraction held by the largest,
second largest, and the third largest owner
of voting equity across ten European coun-
tries and the US. The right section of the
table shows the pairwise ratios between the
largest stakes. The means in the left column
are equally weighted across countries.
The ﬁrst remarkable pattern in table 10
is that the largest average fraction of voting
equity held in a Norwegian listed ﬁrm is con-
siderably smaller than anywhere else in Eu-
rope except in the UK. Disregarding Norway
and the UK, the average largest stake in a Eu-
ropean listed ﬁrm is 48%, which means the
largestowneraloneisveryclose tohavingma-
jority control. In contrast, the largest owner
in an OSE ﬁrm holds just 29%, which does
not even produce a blocking minority against
charter amendments.
Table 10. The concentration of voting rights in Europe and the US.




1 2 3 1/2 1/3 2/3
Austria 50 1996 54 8 3 6.8 18.0 2.7
Belgium 135 1995 56 7 5 8.0 11.2 1.4
France 674 1996 52 10 4 5.2 13.0 2.5
Germany 372 1996 50 3 1 16.7 50.0 3.0
Italy 214 1996 48 10 4 4.8 12.0 2.5
Netherlands 137 1996 43
Spain 193 1995 40 11 6 3.6 6.7 1.8
Sweden 304 1998 38 11 6 3.5 6.3 1.8
Mean Europe
(excl Norway and UK) 48 9 4 5.6 11.5 2.1
UK 250 1992 14 7 6 2.0 2.3 1.2
Mean Europe
(excl Norway) 44 8 4 5.2 10.0 1.9
US 2831 1997 3 1 1 3.0 3.0 1.0
Mean western world
(excl Norway) 40 8 4 5.3 10.0 1.9
Norway 130 1997 29 11 7 2.6 4.1 1.6
The table shows the average fraction of the ﬁrm’s outstanding voting equity which is held by the largest, second
largest, and third largest owner. For each owner size rank, the fractions are equally weighted across ﬁrms, and the
international averages are equally weighted across countries. Relative owner size is the ratio between the correspond-
ing ownership fractions. The data source is Barca and Becht (2001) for all countries except Norway. Holdings are
in percent.
accounts, we cannot determine what fraction of the aggregate international holding is made up of individuals.82 Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard
The second characteristic is that although
the largest Norwegian equity stake is small,
the other large stakes are substantial. For
instance, in no other country is the second
or third largest stake higher. This pattern is
also apparent in the ratios at the right of the
table. For instance, while the largest Norwe-
gian holding is four times the third largest, it
is ten times higher in the rest of Europe ex-
cluding the UK.
Overall, tables 9 and 10 suggest that Nor-
way is an outlier by European standards.
State holdings are unusually large, individual
ownership is exceptionally low, the largest eq-
uity stake is remarkably small, and the power
structure of ownership is very ﬂat. These ob-
servations raise at least two questions. First,
why is this rather peculiar ownership pattern
observed? Second, what is the effect on cor-
porate governance?
Astotheﬁrst question, thepurpose ofthis
paper is primarily to describe ownership pat-
terns rather than testing theories of why they
are observed. Still, we may at least speculate
on potential explanations. The list of possi-
ble determinants include the general political
environment, theregulatoryregimeof theeq-
uity market, and investor wealth constraints.
We brieﬂy discuss these factors one by one.
Norway has had a social-democratic gov-
ernment for almost 50 out of the 65 last
years. As signiﬁcant public involvement in
industry is still a vital component of this po-
litical ideology, our ﬁnding of a compara-
tively high state ownership in listed ﬁrms is
not surprising. Having said that, it should
also be noted that large state holdings are
not always caused by a state policy to own
or control. For instance, the state ownership
in commercial banks, which skyrocketed in
the early nineties, was driven by a motivation
to prevent the negative externalities of a col-
lapsing banking system rather than a desire
to transfer bank ownership from private to
public hands. Moreover, owning a relatively
high aggregate fraction of market value does
not necessarily reﬂect power at the individual
ﬁrm level. Our discussion of ownership con-
centration documented that compared to the
aggregate size of state holdings on the OSE,
the state is underrepresented among the large
owners.
The small size of the largest stake and
the ﬂat power structure may both be par-
tially driven by regulation. Section 4 con-
cluded that the Norwegian legal regime pro-
vides high protection of shareholder rights.
According to La Porta et al. (1998), such a
regulatory framework reduces the cost of be-
ing a small shareholder. Hence, it may be
argued that because the Norwegian regula-
tory regime is similar to the UK system in a
stockholder protection sense, thelowconcen-
tration and the ﬂat power structure in both
countries is consistent with the idea that the
legal framework inﬂuences both the level and
the distribution of large ownership stakes.
The low ownership by individual in-
vestors may be caused by wealth constraints
and the consequent high cost of concentrated
holdings for such investors. Because of its
social–democratic political tradition, Norway
has a more even distribution of income than
most other countries (OECD, 1998). Al-
though we have found no relevant interna-
tional data, we suspect the same holds for
the distribution of wealth. If this is correct,
even the richest individuals in Norway have
relatively low wealth by European standards.
This may imply that in order for wealthy in-
dividuals to be large owners of an OSE ﬁrm,
they have to put a very high fraction of theirPatterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set 83
wealth into one single ﬁrm. Consequently,
the cost of concentrated ownership in terms
of lost diversiﬁcation beneﬁts may be particu-
larly high for individual investors in Norway.
The second fundamental question raised
by our ﬁndings is the potential impact
of ownership structure on corporate gover-
nance. That is, what is the effect on the re-
lationship between principals and agents in
a regime with absent individual (personal)
owners, a relatively small largest owner and a
ﬂat power structure among the large owners.
And, in particular, is the resulting monitor-
ing different from what we ﬁnd in the classic
European setting of signiﬁcant personal own-
ership, a majority owner, and a peaked power
structure?
T h es m a l ls t a k eo ft h el a r g e s tN o r w e g i a n
owner means he has insufﬁcient power to dis-
cipline management through the stockholder
meeting. This monitoring problem is inde-
pendent of whether voting rights are exer-
cised by intermediate agents or by the ulti-
mate principal. If large stockholders act inde-
pendently, theymayproduceasystem charac-
terized by strong managers and weak owners,
which is the current UK system according to
Goergen and Renneboog (1998). However,
as the group of large owners in Norwegian
ﬁrms hold a rather large aggregate stake, the
key to effective monitoring is cooperation.
To illustrate, even though the largest owner
of OSE ﬁrms on average owns just 29% of
the votes, the three largest as a group are close
to having a majority (47%). Thus, while the
owners in the typical European listed ﬁrm
may free–ride on the corporate governance
efforts of the largest owner, the ownership
structure of most Norwegian ﬁrms requires
joint efforts by a team of several large own-
erswhoare individually weak, but collectively
strong. Akeyquestion formonitoring quality
is therefore to whatextentthis pooling of vot-
ing power actually occurs. The critical issue
here is whether the owner type (individual
vs. non–individual) and the power structure
(ﬂat vs. peaked) matters for the relationship
between corporate governance and economic
performance.
In this section, we have found that
the ownership structure of Norwegian listed
ﬁrms is internationally rather atypical. Indi-
v i d u a lo w n e r s h i pi sv e r yl o w( 8 %v s .aE u -
ropean mean of 28%), the largest stake is
remarkably small (29% vs. 44%), and the
power structure of ownership is unusually
ﬂat. We argue that this Norwegian outlier
case may partly be due to a long period of
social-democratic rule (high state holdings,
low individual stakes, and low concentration)
and strong legal protection of stockholders
(low concentration and ﬂat power structure).
We also note that this ownership pattern gen-
erates a system where the monitoring of listed
ﬁrms is delegated from the ultimate owners
to state bureaucrats and corporate managers,
who have high voting rights, but negligible
cash ﬂow rights. Moreover, whereas the low
ownership concentration produces a gover-
nance system of strong managers and weak
owners, it may also be the case that the ﬂat
power structure facilitates joint monitoring
by ownerswhoareindividually weak, but col-
lectively strong.
Summary and conclusions
The objective of this paper is todescribe basic
ownership characteristics of Norwegian listed
ﬁrms, compare them with existing interna-
tional evidence, and to suggest rather than
test possible reasons why these empirical reg-84 Øyvind Bøhren and Bernt Arne Ødegaard
ularities are observed and what they may im-
ply for corporate governance. This section
summarizes and highlights some major ﬁnd-
ings.
Norway is similar to most European
countries in the sense that listed ﬁrms play
a modest but increasingly important role in
the national economy. The regulatory regime
is somewhat special in the sense that even
though the country belongs to the civil law
tradition, which is generally considered less
investor–protective than common law juris-
dictions, Norway’s regulatory environment
still seems to provide better protection of
shareholder rights than what is the case in
many common law countries. Moreover, the
access to high–quality ownership data over
several years is rather exceptional, enabling us
to map out the full ownership structure of ev-
ery ﬁrm listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange
(OSE) in the period 1989–1997. These data
tell us that although individual (personal) in-
vestors is by far the most numerous group,
their aggregate holding of OSE market value
is small and decreasing. Financial investors
in general and mutual funds in particular
increase their share every year, while inter-
national investors hold the largest fraction
of market value. Aggregate state ownership
varies considerably over time, mainly due to
the rescue of ﬁrms considered too important
to fail rather than a result of a deliberate own-
ership policy. Indirect ownership through
otherOSE ﬁrms is rapidly declining, OSE in-
siders are comparable to individual investors
in terms of aggregate holdings, and board
members hold roughly half the insider stakes.
Only investors with large equity stakes
have both the incentive and the power to
inﬂuence corporate governance. We ﬁnd
that national non–ﬁnancial corporations are
much more often among the large owners
than their aggregate holding would suggest,
and that the opposite is true for interna-
tional investors and the state. On average,
the largest owner is too small to act even as a
blocking minority, it takes the four largest to
establish asimple majority, andthetenlargest
to amend the corporate charter. Except in ﬁ-
nancials, where the ownership is restricted by
regulation and the large stakes are consider-
ably smaller than in others ﬁrms, concentra-
tion decreases with increasing ﬁrm size.
Voting equity in dual–class ﬁrms can be
used to separate voting rights from cash ﬂow
rights. We ﬁnd that non–voting shares are
never issued by ﬁnancials, very seldom by
the young and small IPO ﬁrms, and that
non-voting equity is roughly one third of to-
tal equity in industrial and shipping ﬁrms
with dual–class shares. International in-
vestors strongly prefer non-voting stock, both
before and after the regulatory restriction on
their right to hold voting equity was lifted.
Regardless of owner type, the large owners
hold more voting rights than cash ﬂow rights.
However, they still own non-voting shares,
possibly because the required 2/3 majority for
charter amendments applies to voting rights
andcash ﬂow rights alike. It may also reﬂect a
signal to small shareholders that by holding a
relatively high fraction of cash ﬂow rights, the
l a r g eo w n e r sw i l ll o s ei ft h e i rp o w e ri su s e dt o
divert the ﬁrm’s resources to their private do-
main.
Our ﬁndings suggest that regulation mat-
ters for ownership structure. Both the low
concentration and the absence of dual–class
shares in ﬁnancials are probably driven by
the regulatory maximum on holding size per
owner. The law also inﬂuences the size dis-
tribution of large stakes around certain criti-Patterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set 85
cal levels, like theover–representation of large
holdings just below ﬂagging thresholds and
mandatory bid thresholds, and also the over–
representation just above key voting thresh-
olds. Moreover, ﬁnancial owners may be un-
derrepresented among the large owners not
because they are disinterested in corporate
governance, but because regulatory caps re-
strict them from holding large stakes. Fi-
nally, thefactthatthelargestownersofvoting
shares in dual–class ﬁrms hold non–voting
shares as well may be partly due to the voting
rules for charter amendments speciﬁed by the
corporate law.
On the other hand, certain regulations
considered important in the public debate
seem not to matter, probably because the
owner has other objectives than those impli-
citly assumed by the regulator. International
investors as a group seem to regard equity
stakes in OSE ﬁrms as a vehicle for inter-
national diversiﬁcation rather than for power
exertion and corporate governance. In such
a perspective, it is not surprising that the cap
on aggregate holdings of voting shares by in-
ternational investors was very seldom bind-
ing, and that the subsequent lifting of the
cap had no fundamental effect on their rela-
tive demand for voting vs non–voting shares.
This passive diversiﬁcation view is supported
by our ﬁnding that international owners of
voting shares often refrain from using their
voting right by holding voting shares anony-
mously, that they are heavily overrepresented
in non–voting stock, and that they are under-
represented among the large owners of voting
stock.
Compared to other European countries,
corporate ownership in Norway is odd. Cor-
porations and bureaucrats control more vot-
ing power in listed ﬁrms than anywhere else
inEurope, theaggregatestateholding islarge,
the largest owner is unusually small, and the
stakes of the other large owners are remark-
ably big. We speculate that these owner-
ship patterns may be driven by a long period
of social-democratic rule and a strong legal
protection of shareholder rights. Our ﬁnd-
ings raise two basic questions about the func-
tioning of corporate governance mechanisms.
First, what happens to monitoring quality
when the vast majority of managers are mon-
itored by other managers and civil servants
rather than by the ultimate owners? Second,
even if this problem were small because in-
termediate agents behaved like ultimate own-
ers, what corporate governance system is pro-
duced by this peculiar power structure? In
particular, will themoderate size of thelargest
stake create a system of strong managers and
weak owners, or will the ﬂat power structure
generate united owners who are separately
weak, but collectively strong? The answers
to these two questions are crucial for under-
standing the relationship between corporate
governance and economic performance.
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